Germany was stabbed in the back in 1918
| Germany was stabbed in the back in 1918 | |
|---|---|
| FALSE | |
| "The German army was not defeated on the battlefield in the First World War; it was betrayed at home by socialists, revolutionaries, Jews and the politicians who signed the armistice." | |
| Domain | Politics & Elections |
| Tactic | Propaganda Technique Conspiracy Theory |
| Era | Historical |
| First seen | 1918 |
| Origin | German military leaders and nationalist politicians after the armistice of November 1918, most influentially Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg's testimony to a parliamentary inquiry in November 1919 |
| Last reviewed | 2026-10-27 |
| Further reading: books on Politics & Elections | |
The claim that Germany was stabbed in the back in 1918, known in German as the Dolchstoßlegende, held that the German army had been undefeated in the field and was betrayed by enemies on the home front. It shifted blame for Germany's defeat from the military leadership to civilian politicians, socialists, revolutionaries and, in its most poisonous form, Jews. The myth undermined the democratic Weimar Republic from its first days and became a central theme of Nazi propaganda. In reality, Germany's military leaders themselves had concluded by late September 1918 that the war was lost and demanded that the government seek an armistice.
The claim
According to the myth, the German army was holding its ground in 1918 when strikes, mutinies and revolution at home, encouraged by socialists and Jews, forced a surrender. The civilian politicians who signed the armistice on November 11, 1918, and later the Treaty of Versailles, were denounced as the "November criminals."
Origin
In autumn 1918 Germany's de facto military rulers, General Erich Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, faced collapse after Allied offensives and the arrival of large numbers of American troops. On September 29 they told the Kaiser that an armistice must be sought immediately. They also urged that a new government including parliamentary parties be formed, which meant that civilians, not the generals, would be responsible for ending the war. When the armistice came, German troops were still on foreign soil, which made the claim of an undefeated army seem plausible to many Germans who had been told throughout the war that victory was near.
On November 18, 1919, Hindenburg told a parliamentary committee investigating the defeat that the German army had been "stabbed in the back," attributing the phrase to an unnamed English general. His testimony, from Germany's most revered military figure, gave the myth enormous authority.
What the evidence shows
- The army was defeated. Between August and November 1918, Allied forces launched the Hundred Days Offensive, breaking through German defenses, capturing hundreds of thousands of prisoners and pushing German forces into retreat. Germany's allies, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, were collapsing or had surrendered.
- The generals asked for the armistice. The demand for an armistice came from the Supreme Army Command itself, weeks before revolution broke out in Germany in November.
- Jewish Germans fought. Around 100,000 German Jews served in the army, and about 12,000 died. A 1916 army census of Jewish soldiers, intended to show they were avoiding the front, found they served in proportion to their numbers; its results were suppressed, fueling suspicion.
- Historians' consensus. Historians overwhelmingly regard the stab-in-the-back claim as a myth constructed by military and nationalist leaders to escape responsibility.
Consequences
The myth delegitimized the Weimar Republic and its leaders. Matthias Erzberger, who signed the armistice, was assassinated by nationalists in 1921, and Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, who was Jewish, in 1922. Hitler made the betrayal of 1918 a central theme, blaming Jews and Marxists, and the myth helped prepare the ground for Nazi persecution.
Why it persists
The stab-in-the-back myth is a template for later claims that a nation's defeat or decline was caused not by its own leaders' failures but by internal traitors. Versions have appeared in many countries. It shows how a powerful institution can protect its reputation by blaming scapegoats.
Lessons for readers
- Be wary of explanations that blame defeat on internal enemies rather than on decisions by those in power.
- Check who first proposed a course of action before accepting blame being assigned for it.
- Myths gain power when they come from trusted authorities.
- Scapegoating minorities is a recurring and dangerous propaganda technique.
- Ask what evidence the battlefield, or the data, actually shows.
See also
- Communists set the Reichstag fire
- The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
- Denying the Holocaust (Lipstadt)
- Propaganda (Bernays)
Sources
- Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin, 2003).
- Gerd Krumeich, Die unbewältigte Niederlage: Das Trauma des Ersten Weltkriegs und die Weimarer Republik (Herder, 2018).
- Wilhelm Deist, "The Military Collapse of the German Empire: The Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth," War in History 3, no. 2 (1996).
- Testimony of Paul von Hindenburg before the parliamentary committee of inquiry, November 18, 1919.