Saddam Hussein was behind the September 11 attacks

Saddam Hussein was behind the September 11 attacks
	FALSE
	"Saddam Hussein's Iraq was involved in planning or supporting the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and had an operational alliance with al-Qaeda."
Domain	Politics & Elections
Tactic	False Context; Propaganda Technique;
Era	Current
First seen	2001
Origin	Suggestions by US officials and commentators in 2001–2003, including repeated references to an alleged meeting in Prague between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer
Last reviewed	2026-10-27
	Further reading: books on Politics & Elections

The claim that Saddam Hussein was behind the September 11 attacks became widely believed in the United States in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A Washington Post poll in September 2003 found that 69 percent of Americans thought it likely that Saddam had been personally involved. Although President George W. Bush and his officials rarely stated the claim outright, they frequently mentioned Iraq and al-Qaeda together, and some officials promoted specific allegations of contacts. The 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee later found no evidence that Iraq had any role in the attacks and no operational relationship between Saddam's government and al-Qaeda.

The claim

In the months after the attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney repeatedly referred to a report that Mohamed Atta, the lead hijacker, had met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001, describing it as "pretty well confirmed" in a December 2001 television interview. Administration officials spoke of links between Iraq and terrorist groups and warned that Saddam could give weapons to terrorists. In speeches making the case for war, Iraq and the September 11 attacks were often mentioned in close succession, leaving many listeners with the impression of a connection.

What the evidence shows

The Prague meeting. The sole source was an informant whose report Czech officials themselves later doubted. The FBI and CIA found evidence, including phone and travel records, indicating that Atta was in the United States at the time. The CIA concluded that the meeting probably did not occur.
9/11 Commission. The commission's 2004 report found no evidence that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda had developed into a collaborative operational relationship and no evidence that Iraq cooperated with al-Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.
Senate Intelligence Committee. A 2006 report found that Saddam was distrustful of al-Qaeda, viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, and refused requests for assistance. It found that postwar findings did not support prewar claims of a relationship.
Pentagon Inspector General. A 2007 report found that a Pentagon policy office under Under Secretary Douglas Feith had developed alternative intelligence assessments asserting links that were inconsistent with the consensus of the intelligence community, and presented them to senior officials.
Bush's acknowledgment. In September 2003 Bush said there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 attacks.

Why it persists

The belief spread through implication rather than direct statement: repeated juxtaposition of Iraq and September 11, references to unverified contacts, and the emotional aftermath of the attacks. Research on misperceptions about the war found that belief in the link was strongly associated with support for the invasion and with reliance on certain news sources. The case illustrates how false beliefs can be created without a single explicit false statement.

Lessons for readers

Notice when two subjects are repeatedly mentioned together without a stated connection.
Ask whether officials claim a link directly or merely imply it.
Single-source intelligence claims deserve skepticism, especially when contradicted by other evidence.
Strong emotions after an attack make audiences receptive to blaming a familiar enemy.
Check later official inquiries, which often contradict early claims.

Sources

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments (2006).
Office of the Inspector General, US Department of Defense, Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2007).
Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay and Evan Lewis, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War," Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 4 (2003–04).
Dana Milbank and Claudia Deane, "Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds," The Washington Post, September 6, 2003.